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This paper develops a CGE model with unique regional land types and detailed non-CO2 
GHG emissions which it uses to analyze the potential for reductions in land-based 
greenhouse gas emissions as well as forest sequestration.  In our global, general 
equilibrium analysis of carbon taxation, we find that forest carbon sequestration is the 
dominant means for global GHG emissions reduction in the land using sectors. However, 
when compared to the rest of the world, emissions abatement in the US comes 
disproportionately from agriculture, and, within agriculture, disproportionately from 
reductions in fertilizer-related emissions (primarily in maize production). In the world as 
a whole, agriculture-related mitigation comes predominantly in reduced methane 
emissions from ruminant livestock, which is followed in relative importance by 
reductions in methane emissions from paddy rice. We also find significant linkages 
between emissions in one region and mitigation in another (i.e. leakage). For example, in 
the US agriculture, abatement potential is cut in half when we move from a national tax 
to a global carbon tax. This is a consequence of the strong export orientation of US 
agriculture, which responds to reduced production in the rest of the world by increasing 
its own production and hence emissions. 
 
JEL: Q15, Q54. 
Keywords: climate change, land use change, non-CO2 greenhouse gas, marginal 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Changes in land use and land cover represent an important driver of net Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG) emissions. It has been estimated that roughly a third of the total emissions of 
carbon into the atmosphere since 1850 has resulted from land use change (and the 
remainder from fossil-fuel emissions) (Houghton, 2003).  For example, in the 1990s, 6.4 
Gt-C yr-1 was emitted to the atmosphere from industrial activities and 2.2 Gt-C yr-1 was 
emitted from tropical deforestation.  In addition, agricultural land related activities are 
responsible for approximately 50% of global atmospheric inputs of methane (CH4) and 
75% of global nitrous oxide emissions (N2O), for a net contribution from non-CO2 GHGs 
of approximately 14% of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (USEPA, 2006a).  
 
The policymaking community is trying to determine the potential mitigation role and 
implementation rules for agriculture and forestry in future climate policies, including via 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Land-using activities—most notably forest 
sequestration and dedicated biofuel production—offer considerable scope for GHG 
mitigation. A number of estimates have been made of the cost of abating greenhouse gas 
emissions through land use change and land management (Richards and Stokes, 2004; 
USEPA, 2006b, Chapter 5), and recent studies suggest that land-based mitigation could 
be cost-effective and assume a sizable share of overall mitigation responsibility in 
optimal abatement (Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003) and stabilization policies (Rose et 
al., 2006a). However, to date, global economic modeling of land has not been able to 
fully account for the opportunity costs of alternative land-uses and land-based mitigation 
strategies, nor the heterogeneous and dynamic environmental and economic conditions of 
land (e.g., Li et al., 2006; Sohngen and Tennity, 2005).  
 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) economic models are well suited to evaluate 
these kinds of tradeoffs. However, existing CGE frameworks are not currently structured 
to model land use alternatives and the associated emissions sources and mitigation 
opportunities. Partial and general equilibrium and integrated assessment frameworks are 
developing to more carefully study climate change policy and the role of land use change 
in mitigating GHG-induced climate change. This work has been hindered by the lack of 
data; specifically, consistent global land resource and non-co2 GHG emissions databases 
linked to underlying economic activity and GHG emissions and sequestration drivers. 
New global land-use and emissions data developments (Lee et al., 2005; Rose et al., 
2006b), as well as new engineering mitigation costs estimates (USEPA, 2006b), have 
provided a solid foundation for advancing global land modeling.  
 
The focal point of our analysis will be regional and global land-use CGE GHG abatement 
responses. Using the newly available data, we construct a novel modeling framework to 
understand how different land-use opportunities for GHG abatement interact with one 
another on both a regional and global scale,  particularly in light of global market clearing 
conditions for product markets.  This paper extends the initial conceptual work of Lee 
(2004), and presents a fuller and more realistic global-scale implementation of the 
GTAP-AEZ model. Lee (2004) illustrates the potential importance of land mobility in 
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GHG mitigation, finding that failure to account for land mobility within agriculture and 
between agriculture and forestry is likely to result in a large overstatement of the 
marginal cost of mitigation for CO2 and NCGGs.  
 
The GTAP-AEZ framework developed in this paper introduces intra- and inter-regional 
land and land-based GHG emissions heterogeneity and analyzes land allocation decisions 
and general equilibrium market feedbacks under emissions taxation policies.  We work 
with a more disaggregated model structure, aimed at capturing key GHG emissions and 
sequestration activities. The model disaggregates 24 sectors and 3 regions (USA, China, 
and ROW). In line with the goals of this paper, special attention is paid to the land-using 
activities, including forestry, paddy rice, other cereals, other crops and livestock grazing. 
Energy producing and consuming sectors are also disaggregated. The GTAP land use 
database (Lee et al., 2005) enhances the standard GTAP global economic database by 
disaggregating land endowments and land use into 18 Agro-ecological Zones (AEZs: See 
FAO/IIASA, 2000, for a detailed discussion of AEZs). Second, the model incorporates 
newly available non-C02 emissions data from the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(Rose et al., 2006c). Rose et al. (2006b) has mapped the emissions data to sectors and 
emissions drivers in the GTAP data base, which permits us to analyze multi-gas 
emissions abatement scenarios in which land-using activities can both emit and sequester 
carbon. Third, the model’s GHG mitigation responses are calibrated to source-specific 
GHG mitigation cost studies.  
 
We distinguish three types of mitigation responses (costs) in our analysis: those 
associated with sector outputs (e.g., methane emissions from agricultural residue burning), 
those associated with intermediate input usage (e.g., nitrous oxide emissions from 
fertilizer use in crops), and those associated with primary factors (e.g., emissions from 
livestock capital, or alternatively sequestration associated with forest land cover). Each 
individual type of response in the agricultural sector is calibrated to engineering 
information from the EPA, assuming a partial equilibrium (PE) closure of fixed input 
prices and fixed output, by adjustment of the relevant elasticities of substitution in 
production.   Individual responses in the forestry sector are calibrated by utilizing data 
generated from an intertemporal optimizing partial equilibrium model of forestry and 
land use.  Because forestry and agricultural markets compete for the same land, we 
explicitly model intensification (e.g., timber management) efforts differently from 
extensification (e.g., land-use change) efforts in the forestry sector. 
 
Given the exploratory nature of this research, we focus our analysis on the GHG 
abatement schedules by sector and region for major non-CO2 GHG emissions and carbon 
sequestration categories associated with land-using activities, such as methane emissions 
from livestock production and rice cultivation, N2O emissions from nitrogen fertilizer 
applications, and CO2 sequestration in forestry.  
 
Our results show that there is substantial interaction between sectors – primarily via 
competition for land -- and between regions in the global economy – in this case via 
competition in the product markets. Once GHG emissions mitigation enters the picture, 
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the global pattern of comparative advantage is altered, both domestically and 
internationally, and we observe a re-allocation of production in response to carbon prices.  
 
Section 2 describes the GTAP-AEZ model framework, including the land use and non-
CO2 GHG data bases, as well as the specification and calibration of mitigation costs. 
Sections 3 and 4 present the model simulation structure and results respectively. Finally, 




2.  GTAP-AEZ model 
 
The GTAP-AEZ model is a modified version of the standard GTAP model that 
incorporates different types of land. We do this by bringing climatic and agronomic 
information to bear on the problem – introducing different types of productive land via 
Agro-Ecological Zones (AEZs) (FAO/IIASA, 2000). Lee et al. (2005) developed a land-
use and land cover database to facilitate global economic and integrated assessment 
modeling of land. The database offers a consistent global characterization of biophysical 
growing conditions and cropland and forest land use. Specifically, the database defines 
18 global AEZs, as displayed in Figure 1, and identifies 2001 crop and forest extent and 
production for each region by AEZ for specific crop and forest types.1 The land-use 
activity data was used to disaggregate the GTAP v6.0 database sectoral land rents into 18 
separate AEZ land inputs. See Figure 2 for the resulting AEZ land rents by crop type. The 
average level of land rents on different AEZs within and across regions differs widely, 
based on productivity differentials; also movements in the average return to land in each 
AEZ will differ due to differing land allocations across commodities within AEZs. With 
specific land uses and values delineated by AEZ, more refined and realistic modeling of 
competition between different uses for land is possible.  
 
Table 1 reports the associated land rents (at market prices) for the three regions and six 
aggregated AEZs. From Table 1 we can see the relative economic importance (land rental 
share) of each AEZ in each region of our model. For Table 1 we aggregated the land rents 
across climatic zones for each length of growing period (e.g., we aggregated land rents 
from AEZs 1, 7, and 13, which have the same 1-60 day growing period). From this 
aggregation it is clear that AEZ6 dominates the economic value of land in China, while 
AEZ4 dominants in the USA. Not surprisingly, given that it is not far from the global 
aggregate, ROW land rents are more evenly spread across AEZs, with AEZs 3 – 6 all 
generating significant economic activity.  
 
                                                 
1 The AEZs represent six different lengths of growing period (6 x 60 day intervals) spread over three 
different climatic zones (tropical, temperate and boreal). Following the work of the FAO and IIASA (2000), 
the length of growing period depends on temperature, precipitation, soil characteristics and topography. 
The suitability of each AEZ for production of alternative crops and livestock is based on currently observed 
practices, so that the competition for land within a given AEZ across uses is constrained to include 
activities that have been observed to take place in that AEZ. 
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The GTAP-AEZ framework retains a single, national production function for each 
commodity (as in the standard GTAP model), and introduces different AEZs as inputs to 
this national production function (see Figure 4).2 With a sufficiently high elasticity of 
substitution in use (we use 20 for parameter AEZσ ), we are assured that the return to land 
across AEZs, but within a given use, will move closely together, as would be the case if 
we had modeled production of a given homogeneous commodity on each AEZ separately.  
 
We constrain land supply across alternative uses (sectors), within a given AEZ, via a 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) frontier. This is the approach taken in the 
standard GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), and it is an effective means of restricting land 
mobility. In this specification, the absolute value of the CET parameter represents the 
upper bound (the case of an infinitesimal rental share for that use) on the elasticity of 
supply to a given use of land in response to a change in its rental rate. The lower bound 
on this supply elasticity is zero (the case of a unitary rental share – whereby all land is 
already devoted to that activity). Furthermore, we follow the nested CET approach of 
ABARE (Ahammad, 2006). In this framework (see Figure 5), land owners first decide on 
the optimal mix among crops. Based on the composite return to land in crop production, 
relative to the return in ruminant livestock production, the land owner then decides on the 
allocation of land between these two broad types of agricultural activities. This also 
determines the average return to land allocated to farming in general. This return is, in 
turn, compared to that in forestry in order to determine the broad allocation of land 
between these two land-using sectors.  
 
Calibration of the constant elasticity of transformation land supply functions in the model 
is based on the available econometric evidence. The most important elasticity in this 
paper will be the elasticity of land supply to forestry, as forest sequestration subsidies 
send a strong signal to expand forest land. Recent evidence for the US from Choi (2004), 
and Sohngen and Brown (2006) indicates that this elasticity averages about 0.25. 
Accordingly, we set the CET parameter at the bottom of this supply tree ( 1Ω ) equal to -
0.25. This places the maximum forest land supply elasticity at 0.25. In AEZs where the 
forest land share is dominant, the supply elasticity will be much smaller, as would be 
expected. The GTAP model uses a CET value of -1.0, based on econometric evidence for 
land supplies to US crop sectors, which suggests an upper bound of one on this elasticity. 
Accordingly, we set 3Ω  = -1.0. The transformation possibilities between grazing and 
crops uses are deemed to be somewhat smaller, yet larger in absolute value than the 
elasticity of transformation between forestry and agricultural land, therefore we set this 
                                                 
2 The most natural approach to bringing these AEZs into the GTAP model would be to have a different 
production activity for each AEZ/product combination, with the resulting outputs (e.g., wheat) competing 
in the product markets. However, with as many as 18 AEZs possible, this results in a great proliferation of 
sectors and dimensions in the model. In an effort to simplify the model, we propose the following reasoning: 
if we assume that like products produced in each region are perfect substitutes, then a single commodity 
price will prevail. If, in addition, the production functions are similar across AEZs, and the firms face the 
same prices for non-land factors, then land rents in comparable activities must also move together (even if 
they do not share the same initial level). From the point of view of land markets, the focus of this paper, 
this is the key objective of our specification for land use – the returns to land on different AEZs employed 
in the production of the same product must move together.  
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parameter between these two values: 2Ω  = -0.5, so that the degree of land mobility 
doubles at each nest as one moves up the land supply “tree” described by this nested CET 
function. 
 
2.1  Model modifications associated with GHG emissions and sequestration  
 
The model presented here considers only non-CO2 emissions from agriculture and CO2 
sequestration in forests. Given our interest in land-use modeling and goal of elucidating 
land competition and the opportunity costs of alternative land based mitigation, we focus 
on the evaluation of non-CO2 emissions and forest carbon sequestration and the potential 
mitigation role of land use.3   
 
Emissions and Forest Sequestration 
 
Base year non-CO2 emissions are summarized in Figure 3 for the three focus regions for 
this study: USA, China and the Rest Of World (ROW). From Figure 3 it is clear that non-
CO2 emissions from agriculture (crops and livestock) represent well over 50% of the 
China and ROW total non-CO2 equivalent emissions and just under half of the U.S. non-
CO2 emissions. Table 2 summarizes the types of non-CO2 emissions produced by each 
sector. The GTAP non-CO2 dataset was developed from a detailed non-CO2 greenhouse 
gas emissions database specifically designed for use in global economic models (Rose et 
al., 2006c). The USEPA dataset has a disaggregated emissions structure that maps 
directly to countries and economic sectors and facilitates utilization of available input 
activity quantity data, such as energy volumes and land-use acreage. The disaggregated 
structure of the USEPA dataset improves modeling capacity for representing actual 
emitting activities and abatement strategies.4 See Rose et al. (2006b) for a description of 
the methods used in mapping the USEPA non-CO2 emissions into the GTAP version 6 
database’s region and sector structure. In this paper we draw only on the non-CO2 related 
to drivers in the land-using sectors, since that is the focus of our paper. Similar methods 
                                                 
3 We have intentionally omitted fossil fuel combustion CO2 emissions. In addition, other CO2 
emissions/sequestration and mitigation options are also not considered in this analysis. Of particular 
relevance here are biomass burning as well as soil carbon stocks. These emissions and sequestration 
categories will be integrated into the GTAP GHG emissions datasets in the future. Agricultural biomass 
burning non-CO2 emissions are currently included.  
4 Other global emissions datasets have provided valuable regional and global estimates (e.g., USEPA, 
2006a; Olivier, 2002); however, estimated emissions have been developed and presented according to 
IPCC source categories that aggregate across countries, and more importantly, economic sectors and 
activities.  The USEPA database provides 2001 emissions for 29 non-CO2 and Other CO2 GHG emissions 
categories with 153 unique emissions sources (subcategories) for 226 countries. Most of the USEPA 
categories and subcategories were mapped into GTAP (24 categories and 119 subcategories). The excluded 
categories/subcategories include non-CO2 emissions associated with biomass burning not uniquely 
attributable to anthropogenic activity, tropical forest fire deforestation, biomass combustion, underground 
storage and geothermal energy, and Other CO2 emissions not attributable to fossil fuel combustion. The 
omitted emissions subcategories will be added to the database in the future as methodologies are developed 
and activity data becomes available. The new dataset complements the GTAP fossil fuel combustion CO2 
emissions database (Lee, 2005), and the GTAP forest carbon stock dataset (Lee et al., 2005).  
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could be used to incorporate emissions in the industrial and services sectors of the 
economy. 
 
In order to model GHG emissions and the marginal cost of abatement, we have further 
modified the standard model in a number of ways. We model three categories of non-CO2 
emissions drivers: outputs, factor inputs (endowments), and intermediate inputs. 
Emissions are assumed to fluctuate in proportion to changes in the level of a given driver. 
For example, increased fertilizer usage in the production of maize is associated with 
higher levels of N2O emissions. Of course in the context of constructing an emissions 
baseline, one might wish to also consider exogenous adjustments to emissions factors 
over time, especially over long time horizons, as technologies evolve. This would be 
handled in our model via exogenous technical change along a baseline path. Table 3 
reports total non-CO2 emissions by land-using sector and emissions driver category 
(output, endowments and intermediate inputs). From the “Region total” column, we see 
that the US and China together account for 28% of global non-CO2 emissions. World-
wide 26% of the emissions are tied to endowment drivers – mainly CH4 emissions from 
rice paddies, and CH4 and N2O from enteric fermentation and manure management. 13% 
of the world total non-CO2 emissions are tied to intermediate input use – for the “Other 
Grain” and the “Other Crops” sectors, fertilizer use is the key source of emissions.  
 
Introducing a Specific Tax on GHG-emissions 
 
In order to simulate potential mitigation behavior, we introduce the possibility of taxing 
inputs that are associated with GHG emissions. These are specific taxes – that is they 
depend on the quantity of emissions (in tonnes of carbon equivalent) – so they must be 
converted to ad valorem equivalent form in order to interact with the remaining tax 
system in the model. It is instructive to see how this works: 
 
[ / ] [ ( / ) ]ijr ijr ijr ir ijr ijr ir irt to PM PM PMθ τ τΔ = Δ + ⋅ Δ − ⋅Δ  
   
The left hand side of this equation represents the change in the ad valorem tax rate on 
inputs (e.g., fertilizer used in corn production). This depends on the change in the 
ordinary, ad valorem, tax, ijrtoΔ , the change in the specific tax, ijrτΔ , and the change in 
the market price of the input in question: irPMΔ . Assume for the time being that the 
ordinary tax doesn’t change and the input is in perfectly elastic supply, so the price 
doesn’t change. Then the change in the ad valorem tax on fertilizer use in corn 
production depends on the change in the specific tax on the associated emissions, 
adjusted for the emissions intensity of fertilizer. The latter is just total emissions from 
fertilizer use in corn production in a given region, divided by the amount of fertilizer used. 
We denote this emissions intensity: ijrθ . We must divide this by  the price of fertilizer, 
irPM , we obtain the coefficient in the equation above, which simply becomes tonnes of 
emissions, per dollar of fertilizer inputs purchased, valued at market prices.  
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So the economic impact of an emissions tax associated with input usage will depend not 
only on the size of the tax, but also on the emissions intensity of the input.5 The larger 
this intensity, the greater the impact of a given $/tonne tax on the sector/input in question.  
Table 4 reports some key emissions intensities from the model for USA and China. USA 
has the higher emissions intensity in fertilizer, but ruminants and paddy rice show much 
higher emissions intensities in China. These are the activities/regions where we expect to 
see relatively stronger reductions in emissions following a uniform global carbon tax. 
 
There is a closely related emissions intensity, /ijr jrPMCα , which measures the carbon 
intensity of forests (MtC/$input) and drives the incentives for carbon sequestration. In 
this case, sequestration is tied to the use of land, which is “taxed” input – in this case a 
negative tax, i.e. a sequestration subsidy. In addition to land rents, we include “own-use” 
of forest products by the forest sector in this composite. So jrPMC reflects the combined 
price (rental rate) of land and own-forest use. Subsequently we will refer to this as the 
“carbon-augmented land” input into forestry. The reason for including own-use is that it 
permits us to introduce a management intensification response to the sequestration 
subsidy. The precise mechanism for doing so will be explained below.   
 
The relevant equation for determining the change in ad valorem input tax (subsidy) in 
forestry follows:  
 
[ / ] [ ( / ) ]jr ijr jr ijr ijr jr jrts PMC s s PMC PMCα τ τΔ = ⋅ Δ − ⋅Δ  
 
The left hand side of this equation represents the change in the ad valorem sequestration 
tax rate (this will be negative for a subsidy) on augmented land. This depends on the 
change in the specific tax, ijrsτΔ , and the change in the price of carbon-augmented land: 
irPMCΔ . Clearly, as with the tax on emission-related inputs, the market impact of a 
change in the sequestration subsidy will depend on the carbon intensity of the forests, 
/ijr jrPMCα . The calibrated intensity levels for each of the three regions is reported in 
Table 4. It is larger in ROW than in China and USA, therefore advantaging ROW in the 
matter of forest carbon sequestration. Of course, the carbon intensity of the forest is a 
complex function of a number of factors. For example, it depends on the age of the forest, 
the species selected, as well as the management practices undertaken. Optimizing all of 
these margins in response to a carbon sequestration subsidy is beyond the scope of the 
GTAP-AEZ model. Therefore, as with the other sources of mitigation response, we will 
adopt a “reduced form” approach to capturing the extensive and intensive margins for 
forest carbon sequestration – in this case drawing on results from a dyamic model of 
global timber markets and carbon supply (see Sohngen and Mendelsohn; Sohngen and 




                                                 
5 The tax on emissions is rebated to the regional household in the same way any tax would be re-circulated 
in the GTAP model. 
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In keeping with most CGE analysis, the extended GTAP-AEZ model represents 
technology via a set of production functions in which the key parameters are elasticities 
of substitution amongst groups of inputs. These may be viewed as smooth 
approximations to dozens – even hundreds -- of underlying technologies, each with their 
own factor intensities. As the price of one input, say fertilizer, rises, firms are expected to 
adopt less fertilizer-intensive practices. In our framework, the scope for conservation of 
fertilizer is captured by the elasticity of substitution between fertilizer and other inputs. If 
this is large, then a small tax on fertilizer use will induce a large reduction in fertilizer use. 
If the elasticity is small, then the it will take a large tax to induce a significant reduction 
in fertilizer usage at a given level of crop output. These elasticities of substitution are 
therefore key to determining the marginal abatement cost for emissions from various 
activities in our model. This section discusses how the GTAP-AEZ GHG abatement 
response schedules are derived and how they are calibrated for alternative abatement 
technologies. 
 
Case 1: Emissions tied to the level of usage of a given input 
 
There are many non-CO2 emissions that are closely related to input use. Nitrous oxide 
emissions from fertilizer usage and methane emissions from livestock are two obvious 
examples. Tying emissions to particular inputs allows for a more refined representation 
of abatement responses with emissions being managed via adjustments to individual 
inputs and production maintained via input substitution. In these cases, we have two 
choices: (a) follow the approach typically used for CO2 abatement associated with energy 
fossil fuel combustion and use the best possible econometric evidence on substitution 
elasticities, letting the GTAP-AEZ abatement response schedules fall where they may, or 
(b) adjusting the elasticities of substitution to give an externally estimated degree of 
abatement response. The advantage of the latter approach is that it permits us to draw on 
detailed engineering studies which are directly pertinent to the issue at hand–emissions 
abatement. We have chosen the latter approach. 
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has estimated the engineering 
mitigation costs and emissions implications for alternative management strategies for key 
non-CO2 emissions sources and costs for significant agricultural non-CO2 emissions 
sources—paddy rice, other croplands (wheat, maize, soybean), and livestock enteric and 
manure emissions (Delhotal et al., forthcoming; USEPA, forthcoming). From these data, 
we were able to construct mitigation response curves that correspond to the GTAP-AEZ 
region and sector structure, and can be used for calibration purposes. The second column 
of Table 5 indicates the drivers associated with the derived mitigation response curves by 
GTAP-AEZ land-using sectors.6 For example, the methane emissions associated with 
paddy rice production are tied to land use, as the emissions tend to be proportional to the 
amount of paddy land. Nitrous oxide emissions from maize production are tied to 
fertilizer use. And methane emissions associated with ruminants are tied to the ruminant 
(capital) stock. In those cases where a specific input is not associated with emissions, the 
driver is assumed to be output.  
 
                                                 
6 USEPA (2006b) year 2000 mitigation cost curves were used for calibrating the agriculture sectors.  
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The overall GTAP-AEZ production structure is illustrated in Figure 6. In calibrating to 
the abatement possibilities associated with input-related emissions, we utilize the two 
input-related elasticities of substitution: ESUBT, the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate inputs, and ESUBVA, the elasticity of substitution between primary factors.  
For purposes of calibration, we fixed output levels in the sectors, as well as input prices 
to match the partial equilibrium assumptions of the engineering cost estimates. We then 
vary the carbon equivalent price to map out a partial equilibrium abatement response for 
the relevant sector in each region.  Depending on the emissions source, one of the two 
input elasticities is adjusted so that the model mimics the estimated reduction in 
emissions obtained from the engineering based response curve. In particular, we target 
the response at $50/tCeq. Table 5 reports the resulting elasticities of substitution among 
inputs obtained through this exercise.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates the results from the calibration for USA cropland emissions mitigation 
response. The piecewise linear abatement cost schedule is obtained from the US EPA, 
while the smooth curve is obtained from the calibrated GTAP-AEZ model. This figure 
highlights a number of important calibration issues. First, the USEPA cost curves 
estimate what are referred to as “no regrets” options at negative carbon equivalent prices. 
These options are described as profitable, but currently not adopted. As with Hyman et al. 
(2003), we assume that unaccounted for costs and barriers prevent the implementation of 
such no-regrets options and their associated emissions reduction benefits are assumed to 
be illusory. Therefore, our calibrated MAC curve begins at the origin and rises smoothly 
to the point of calibration ($50/tonne).  
 
Another calibration issue stems from the fact that the USEPA estimates represent a 
limited set of discrete technologies. This creates two problems for this sort of calibration: 
some sections of the cost response curves are non-differentiable; and, eventually all 
currently envisioned mitigation options are exhausted. The substitution elasticity 
approach can not account for either of these characteristics. Instead, the elasticities 
provide smooth abatement cost curve, which may imply unrealistic abatement 
possibilities at very high levels of taxation. Of course additional technologies may 
become available when prices reach a high level. However, this is purely speculative, and 
so we must be wary of using this current representation outside of its calibration range. 
Accordingly, we restrict our analysis to carbon taxes below $100/tonne.  
 
Case 2: Emissions not directly related to input use 
 
In other cases, it may be difficult to tie emissions directly to input usage due to a lack of 
input use data or econometric production cost estimates. Here, it is most natural to tie 
emissions to the aggregate output of the sector. However, if we attempt to mitigate 
emissions by simply taxing output, the only vehicle for emissions reduction is to reduce 
the total production in the sector. This seems unrealistic, as engineering analyses suggest 
that – for a cost – emissions per unit of output can often be reduced, i.e., the partial 
equilibrium, output-constant, abatement response curve is rarely vertical at the origin. In 
order to capture this possibility, we follow the approach developed by Hyman et al. (2003) 
for use in MIT’s EPPA model. This involves modifying the data base in order to treat 
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emissions as an “input” to the production process. Furthermore, a non-zero elasticity of 
substitution between emissions and all other inputs suggests that the emissions intensity 
of the industry can be reduced by substituting (all) other inputs for emissions. This can be 
thought of as buying new machinery, hiring additional labor, employing higher quality 
inputs, etc. Unlike the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, for example, 
this new elasticity of substitution cannot be directly estimated. Indeed, it is a fiction 
invented to permit us to calibrate the model to mitigation engineering studies. The 
calibrated values for these elasticities of substitution are also reported in Table 5 under 
the column heading “output-elasticities”. 
 
Case 3: Forest carbon sequestration 
 
Forest carbon stocks can be increased by increasing the biomass of existing forest 
acreage (the intensive margin) or by converting non-forest lands to forests (the extensive 
margin). Using the partial equilibrium, dynamic optimization model of global timber 
markets and carbon stocks described in Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2006), we have 
generated regional forest carbon supply curves.7  We refer to this model throughout as the 
"global timber model."  In the global timber model, when incentives for carbon 
sequestration (carbon prices) are introduced, the endogenous variables (harvest age, 
harvest area, land use change, and timberland management) adjust in order to maximize 
net surplus in the timber market and the benefits from carbon sequestration.  Cumulative 
carbon sequestration in each period is calculated as the difference between total carbon 
stored in the carbon price scenario and that recoreded in the baseline (no carbon prices).  
Annual sequestration can then be estimated from the decadal changes in cumulative 
sequestration.  Cumulative and annual sequestration is calculated for each of the 13 
aggregate regions in the model, and the results are reported in Table 6. We will turn to 
the specific entries momentarily. 
 
The global timber model used in this analysis is a long-run model that simulates carbon 
sequestration potential by decade for 100 years.  In this paper, however, we are interested 
in the annual sequestration potential over the first two decades because our comparative 
static, general equilibrium analysis focuses on the potential sequestration of a single 
“representative” year within this first 20 years.  To make the link between the two types 
of models (dynamic partial equilibrium and static general equilibrium models), a 
projection of cumulative sequestration by the end of the first and second decades is used 
to calculate the present value carbon equivalent over the first 20 year period.  Then, this 
present value amount is used to calculate the annual equivalent amount of carbon.  
Because the global timber model assumes a 5% discount rate, both the present value 
carbon and annual equivalent amount are calculated based on this same 5% discount rate. 
 
                                                 
7 The model maximizes the net present value of consumers’ surplus in timber markets less costs of 
managing, harvesting, and holding forests.  In so doing, it determines the optimal age of harvesting trees 
(and thus the quantity harvested) in accessible regions, the area of inaccessible timber harvested, the area of 
land converted to agriculture, and timber management endogenously.  Full detail is available in Sohngen 
and Mendelsohn (2006)  
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Carbon sequestration in each region can be decomposed into the amount derived from 
land use change, aging of timber, and modified management of existing forests.  The land 
use change component is what we refer to as the “extensive” margin, and it is reported in 
the first column of Table 6. These entries are determined by assessing the annual change 
in forestland area, tracking new hectares in forests (compared to the baseline), and 
tracking the carbon on those hectares.  For regions that undergo afforestation in response 
to carbon policies (temperate regions), carbon in new hectares is tracked by age class so 
that the accumulation of carbon on new hectares occurs only as fast as the forests grow.  
For regions where reductions in deforestation are a primary action in climate policy 
(typically tropical countries), the reductions in deforestation have an instantaneous effect 
on carbon (because they maintain a carbon stock that would otherwise be lost).  
Reductions in deforestation have a very small impact on storage of carbon in the 
temperate forests of the U.S. and China.   Thus smaller benefits from land use change are 
expected in initial periods in these two countries, while larger benefits are expected in 
tropical regions in initial periods. Indeed, we see this in Table 6, where the carbon storage 
at $5/tonne due to land use change is very small in US and China, whereas it is quite 
large (143 MMTCE on an annualized basis) in the ROW region. Thus the extensive 
margin portion of the forest sequestration abatement cost curve for ROW is quite flat 
initially (see Figure 9).  
 
The intensive margin for forest sequestration consists of several components. The aging 
component is estimated by comparing the carbon that accrues in forests under the 
particular carbon price scenario examined versus the carbon that would have accrued if 
timberlands were managed at the age class dictated by the baseline.  The algorithm used 
to calculate carbon due to aging does not distinguish between old and new hectares.  Thus, 
if newly forested hectares are harvested in age classes older than the baseline age class, 
the component derived from aging is counted as part of the aging component rather than 
as part of the afforestation component. This interaction between the extensive and 
intensive margins can give rise to negative contributions to sequestration at very low 
carbon prices (see US entry for $5/tonne)  
 
The management component is calculated similarly, that is carbon sequestered under the 
carbon price scenario is compared to carbon sequestered assuming the same forests are 
managed with the same intensity as in the baseline.  The combined effect of management 
and aging represent the intensive margin for sequestration, as they reflect the stock of 
carbon per unit of forestland. The forestry model’s predictions for annualized 
sequestration at the intensive margin at each carbon price in the first 20 years are reported 
in the second column of Table 6. And Figure 10 graphs the annual total sequestration rate 
on this intensive margin for the USA region, in response to a carbon subsidy ranging 
from $1/tonne to $200/tonne. Again, remember that these annual rates have been 
computed using a 20 year period. (Extending this horizon further would increase the 
potential for sequestration as longer term adjustments would be taken into account.) 
Clearly the potential for increasing the carbon stock is considerable —particularly in the 
range of interest in this paper, namely up to $100/tonne. 
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The remaining two columns in Table 6 refer to aspects of the global timber model 
sequestration estimates that we do not take into account. The first of these is carbon 
storage in wood products. With more wood products sold, the potential for carbon losses 
as these products are used increases. This could be accounted for in our framework, since 
we do follow the wood products through the marketing channel, and tracing them to 
eventually to consumers. However, we have not yet estimated the carbon content of these 
flows and the associated stocks in our model. The second aspect that we ignore is the 
potential for setting aside forests at the accessible/inaccessible margin in temperate and 
boreal regions. Here, we only focus on the competition between forest and agricultural 
land in these regions. 
 
In summary, we find that, at the lower end of the price range investigated (e.g., $5 - 
$50/tonne), forests in the U.S. could potentially sequester 0.4 – 95.5 million tonnes of 
carbon per year over the first 20 years (Table 6).  These estimates are consistent with a 
recent detailed national assessment of U.S. sequestration potential in forestry, which 
suggests that for $55/tonne, up to 88.8 million tonnes of carbon per year could be 
sequestered in U.S. forests (Murray et al., 2005).  China is estimated to have more overall 
potential for sequestration over similar carbon price ranges, with up to 130 million tones 
of carbon per year possible at the carbon price of $50/tonne.  As prices rise above 
$50/tonne, sequestration potential increases.  Together, the U.S. and China constitute 
about 13% of global potential sequestration over the next 20 years.  This is a surprisingly 
large proportion of the total carbon given that these countries contain only about 10% of 
the world's total forestland. However, these estimates suggest that there is surprising 
potential to increase carbon by forest management in the near-term. 
 
To include such potential forest mitigation strategies in the GTAP-AEZ model, we 
modify the production structure of the forest sector as shown in Figure 7. We apply the 
sequestration subsidy to an augmented land input that includes both composite land 
(aggregated AEZs in forestry) as well as own-use of forestry products in the forestry 
sector. These are allowed to substitute in production with an elasticity of substitution 
equal to carbonσ . While such a grouping of inputs may not appear intuitive at first glance, 
it works well to mimic the two margins along which forest carbon can be increased, 
namely the intensive margin (modified management and aging) and the extensive margin 
(more land in forests). Assume first that carbonσ  = 0 in Figure 7. In this case, the effect of 
the sequestration subsidy will be to increase the profitability of forest activities under 
current management practices, thereby leading to an expansion of forest land with 
constant carbon intensity. Total forest carbon is increased simply by increasing the total 
area in forest. This is the extensive margin and we calibrate it to the $100/tonne estimates 
in Table 6 by adjusting the incremental annual carbon intensity of forests to the levels 
reported in Table 4. The higher the forest carbon intensity, the stronger the profitability 
and hence land area response to the sequestration subsidy. The forest carbon 
sequestration curve obtained from the model via extensive margin (land use) for the 
ROW region is reported in Figure 9. As can be seen, the GTAP-AEZ mitigation cost 
curve intersects that of the global timber model at the calibration point of $100/tonne. 
The two curves are quite similar up to the $100/tonne level. However, after that point, the 
calibrated MAC (dark line) has considerably more curvature than that displayed by the 
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global timber model. The global timber model does not have a fully developed land 
competition model, and consequently, may over-estimate potential sequestration at the 
higher carbon prices.  Thus, for this analysis, we restrict our analysis to carbon prices to 
be below  $100/tonne.  
 
In contrast to the extensive margin just explored, we might consider fixing the total land 
in forestry (set 1Ω  = 0 in Figure 5), introducing carbonσ  > 0 in Figure 7. In this case, as 
forest carbon rents rise, the subsidy will encourage an increase in the carbon intensity of 
forest sector output. In our model this is reflected in a substitution of the intermedidate 
forest product input for land. This has the effect of reducing net forestry output from the 
sector (net output is gross output produced in this production function, less own-use), and 
thereby increasing the carbon intensity per unit of output. In effect, producers are 
choosing to sacrifice some sales of commercial timber by adopting production practices 
that increase the carbon content on existing forest land. This is the intensive sequestration 
margin, and it is calibrated by adjusting carbonσ  until GTAP-AEZ produces the desired 
level of carbon sequestration at the $100/tonne level of subsidy. The calibrated forest 
carbon sequestration supply curve via the intensive margin is the dark curve shown in 
Figure 10 for the USA. We can see that this formulation of the GTAP-AEZ model 
permits us to replicate abatement costs from the dynamic timber model quite well for 
subsidies under $100/tonne.   
 
This completes our discussion of the general equilibrium model, and the associated data 
base and parameters which aim to accurately reflect partial equilibrium abatement 
possibilities in land using sectors. We now turn to an analysis which highlights the 
general equilibrium interactions between these land-using sectors, both through the land 




Method for Analysis  
 
The focal point of our analysis will be the regional and global GTAP-AEZ GHG 
abatement supply schedules. Having calibrated the model to a range of partial 
equilibrium abatement cost curves, each of which assumes that conditions in the other 
sectors do not change, we seek to understand how these different sources of abatement 
interact with one another – particularly given the regional constraints on land use, by 
AEZ, as well as the global constraint that product supply equals demand. Accordingly, 
we estimate general equilibrium abatement schedules by region and sector. This is done 
by varying the per unit carbon tax systematically from $1/tonne to $100/tonne, each time 
re-solving the general equilibrium model and observing the sources and extent of 
abatement in the land using sectors. We are keenly interested in. In order to better 
understand the competition between sectors for land, as well as the global general 
equilibrium effects, we conduct several intermediate simulations to help us isolate the 
various effects at work before considering the global impacts of a global carbon tax.  
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We begin our analysis by exploring the domestic resource implications of carbon taxes 
applied in the US only. This allows us to trace out the USA-only general equilibrium 
abatement response schedules. In this case, we focus on competition for land in the US, 
as forest carbon sequestration encourages an expansion of forest land at the expense of 
other activities. Of course changes in the supply of forest and agriculture products in the 
US has an impact on world markets, and therefore on the relative incentives to produce in 
China and ROW. Thus, we can expect spillover effects from the US-based carbon taxes. 
For example, a carbon tax that reduces fertilizer use in the US will have an impact on 
world prices for crops and fertilizer. In particular, lower usage of fertilizer in the US will 
cause world fertilizer prices to fall, and crops prices to rise. Thus there is an incentive for 
producers in other regions to increase fertilizer use and crops output, unless of course 
they too are subject to the tax. By examining the impact of a US only tax initially, we can 
identify the magnitude of regional emissions leakage effects in non-CO2 gas abatement 
stemming from the shifting of global production in land-using sectors, in response to 
regional taxes. We then perform a similar experiment, only now levying the tax on the 
rest of the world (omitting the US). This generates abatement in ROW, and leakage 
(increased emissions) in the US. Finally, we put these pieces together and examine the 
impact of a global tax on carbon – both on the USA and on the world as a whole.  
 
General Equilibrium Abatement Cost Schedules and Leakage  
 
Figure 11 portrays the general equilibrium, mitigation responses for forestry and for the 
aggregate agriculture sector, respectively, in the wake of carbon price policies 
implemented in the US only. At $5/tonne of carbon, forestry and agriculture appear to be 
of equal importance. However, from there, the two abatement curves begin to diverge, as 
the agriculture abatement schedule becomes more inelastic and the forestry sequestration 
schedule becomes more elastic. By $10/tonne, forest sequestration accounts for double 
the abatement of agriculture, and by the time the carbon price reaches $50/tonne, it is 
roughly four times as large.  
 
Figure 11 also reports the portion of forest sequestration in the US that is attributable to 
the intensification effect. I.e., this is the amount of sequestration that would occur if no 
additional land moved into forestry. Clearly the potential for carbon sequestration 
through changes in management is substantial (recall also Table 6 and Figure 10), 
accounting for half of total forest sequestration at the $50/tonne tax rate. Of course the 
remaining portion of the general equilibrium sequestration is due to an expansion in 
forested land area. This forest extensification effect has two different effects on emissions 
from agriculture. On the one hand, it bids land away from agriculture production, thereby 
reducing output and hence emissions – particularly of those GHG emissions linked to 
land use. On the other hand, it encourages more intensive production on the remaining 
land in agriculture. In a separate simulation of the forest sequestration subsidy alone, we 
have ascertained that the former effect dominates, and overall agriculture emissions are 
somewhat reduced as a result of the forest sequestration alone. Of course, when these 




In summary, our results for the U.S. indicate that about 20 million t Ceq. can be abated 
each year in the agricultural sector and about 120 million t Ceq can be sequestered in the 
forestry sector for $50/t Ceq. It is instructive to compare these estimates to other 
estimates in the literature,  For similar prices, Murray et al. (2005) find that 
approximately 9 million t Ceq of CH4 and NO2 emissions can be abated in the 
agricultural sector annually, and about 97 million t Ceq per year can be sequestered in the 
forestry sector.   
 
It is difficult to know for certain what drives these differences without more explicit 
examination and comparison of the modeling approaches and results.  However, it is 
worth noting that the Murray et al. (2005) study considers only the United States, with 
few links to the rest of the world.  In contrast, this study models interactions across all 
global regions in all markets (inputs and outputs). Thus, one would expect that our 
analysis of carbon taxes only in the U.S. would lead to lower marginal cost estimates.  In 
our model, if carbon taxes are applied only in the U.S., input and output price effects in 
the U.S. agricultural and forestry sectors are moderated by responses in other countries.  
In the regional only model of Murray et al. (2005), where no such responses are possible, 
one would expect stronger price changes, and consequently higher marginal costs for 
abatement and sequestration.  For example, we expect that our marginal costs for the U.S. 
under a global carbon tax would lead to higher marginal costs (see analysis below). 
 
Now turn to the disaggregation of the US abatement schedule for agriculture, by sub-
sector, as reported in Figure 12. As noted above, emissions from paddy rice, ruminant 
and non-ruminant livestock are largely methane, while emissions from other grains and 
other crops are dominanted by NO2 associated with fertilizer applications. As can be seen 
from this figure, farm sector abatement in the US is dominated by other grains (largely 
maize) in the US. This is followed by other crops and ruminants. Abatement in rice and 
non-ruminants is quite modest in the US, even at our calibration point of $50/tonne, in 
response to a US-only carbon tax. 
 
Now turn to the impact of this same USA-only carbon tax policy on emissions in ROW. 
We begin our analysis of this leakage effect by examining the trade impacts, as reported 
in the first three colulmns of Table 7. These results, under the “USA only” header, reports 
the net trade (change in fob exports less change in cif imports) impacts of the US-only tax 
(at a carbon price of $100/tonne). Here, we see that net exports of crop and livestock 
products fall sharply in the wake of the carbon tax. The largest drop is for the heavily 
traded other grains and crops sectors, followed by ruminant products. This decline in net 
exports is made up in the US by increased exports of forestry and wood products, as well 
as fertilizer and energy intensive manufactures, and other manfactures and services. In 
ROW and China, net agricultural exports expand to offset the reductions in USA. This is 
dominated by expansion in ROW, with China accounting for a very small increase in net 
farm exports. Note that the row totals (sum across countries) within this experiment do 
not equal zero due to the presence of trade and transport margins (difference between cif 
and fob valuation of trade). The column totals reflect the change in trade balance for each 
region. These do sum to zero (subject to rounding error) due to the general equilibrium 
requirement of global trade balance. 
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The expansion of net exports in ROW in response to the US-only carbon tax is fueled by 
an increase in production, as well as an intensification of production due to lower cost 
inputs. This, in turn, increases non-CO2 emissions in ROW. This leakage effect in ROW 
in the case of agriculture sectors, following the US-only carbon tax, is displayed in Figure 
13. The emissions leakage is roughly equal for other grains and for ruminant livestock 
products. While the increase in net exports is larger for other grains, this sector is less 
emissions intensive. Trade impacts are much smaller for non-ruminants, which are also 
much less emissions intensive, and so the ROW leakage in this sector is very small. 
Finally, note that  there is actually a small reduction in ROW emissions of methane from 
rice production (negative leakage, or abatment). This arises due to the fact that rice is less 
heavily traded than other grains, and so the net export impacts are much smaller. 
Therefore, the direct impact on production from increased net exports in ROW is quite 
small, and this increased production is met via increased yields instead of increased land 
area. (Land rents in ROW are rising in the wake of increased demand for land in 
agriculture – particularly in other grains production.) Indeed, the area in rice production 
in ROW actually declines slightly. Hence the decline in paddy rice-related emissions. 
 
Figure 14 broadens the leakage picture to include forestry, alongside aggregate 
agriculture leakage. Just as forestry dominates the abatement story in the US, it also 
dominates the leakage of emissions in ROW, in the wake of a US-only carbon tax. With 
higher prices for agricultural products following the carbon tax in the US, agriculture 
expands in ROW and this results in more rapid deforestation, and hence increased net 
GHG emissions in the rest of the world. At a carbon price of $50/tonne, this leakage is 
about 10% of the forestry abatement reported in the US. And it is about four times as 
large as the agriculture-related leakage. In contrast, total leakage in China following the 
$50/tonne carbon tax is only about one MMTCeq. – or about 5% of the leakage in ROW 
following the US only tax. Figure 14 also offers a breakout of forestry leakage by 
reporting the leakage which results solely from the intensification effect in ROW. In this 
case, the higher global price for commercial timber actually encourages less carbon-
intensive production techniques in ROW. However, this effect reaches its maximum at 
the $50/tonne carbon price, after which all of the forestry leakage is through reductions in 
forest land area (the extensive component). 
 
Similarly, we can examine the impact of a carbon tax applied in non-US regions on USA 
emissions. For example, Figure 15 displays the resulting impact on US emissions, when 
taxes are applied in the ROW region. (As with the impact of US taxes on emissions in 
China, the increase in emissions in the US when a tax in applied in China is very small – 
on the order of 1 MMtCeq.) The leakage to USA from ROW carbon taxes is over 25 
MMtCeq. Indeed, the total magnitude of the leakage to USA as a result of a carbon tax in 
ROW is nearly the same as the leakage to ROW as a result of a USA carbon tax. 
However, the composition is quite different. Whereas forestry dominated the leakage to 
ROW following the USA tax, agriculture is much more important when the tax is levied 
in ROW and the leakage occurs in the USA market. Indeed, above $50/tonne, leakage 
through expansion in USA agriculture dominates that through expansion in USA forestry 
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following a carbon tax in ROW. And the intensification component of forestry leakage is 
very small in this case (Figure 15). 
 
We can gain some insight into the strong agricultural leakage from ROW to USA, 
following the carbon tax in ROW, by referring once again to Table 7 – this time shifting 
our attention to the second group of columns. Here, we see very large reductions in net 
exports for agricultural products in the ROW region – indeed the reduction in net exports 
of rice is five times as large as that arising in the US under the US only tax. The bulk of 
these reductions are made up by increases in USA net exports – particularly for ruminants 
and other grains. Meanwhile, the incentive to produce and sell forest products in the US 
falls, thereby encouraging the movement of land out of forestry and into agriculture in 
USA. 
 
Figure 16 reports the composition of leakage to US emissions in response to the ROW 
only carbon tax. In contrast to the ROW leakage in response to the US tax, this figure 
shows that other grains (maize) dominates the leakage story, accounting for about half of 
the total. This is due to the very strong trade effects (Table 7), coupled with the relatively 
high emissions intensity for this producct (i.e., fertilizer applications). Ruminants and 
other crops are a distant second and third in importance, with negligible leakage arising 
through the response of rice production in the US. 
 
Next, we turn to the impacts of a global carbon tax. The impact on US emissions over a 
range of carbon prices is reported in Figure 17. A priori we expect the impact on US 
GHG emissions to be roughly equal to the combined effect of the USA-only tax on US 
emissions and the ROW-only tax on US emissions. Indeed the curves in this figure are 
similar to the general equilibrium abatement response for the USA when the tax is 
applied only in the USA – with the curves shifted to the left to account for USA response 
to the ROW and China taxes. Note that the US abatement in agriculture is only about half 
a large, for a given carbon tax, under the global vs. the unilateral tax policy. Thus the 
impact of global trade is very significant in the case of emissions from US agriculture. 
These leakage effects also diminish the overall importance of ruminants, relative to crops 
in the global abatement schedules.  
 
Figure 18 reports the aggregate agriculture abatement schedule, along with that for 
forestry and the total abatement schedule from land using activities. Whereas leakage 
cuts the US abatement from agriculture in half when we move from the US-only to the 
global carbon tax, the impact on forest sequestration is quite modest.  This is to be 
expected given that the forest response in the GTAP-AEZ model is calibrated on results 
from a global timber market model that already accounts for price changes globally.  The 
global tax thus implies that the relative importance of agriculture in total abatement 
diminishes when considering a global carbon tax versus a regional carbon tax. This figure 
also shows the forest sequestration abatement at the intensive margin, which, as before, 
accounts for about half of the total sequestration in the US. This stands in sharp contrast 
to forest sequestration in ROW in the wake of a global carbon tax (Figure 19), where the 
role of forest carbon sequestration is even more dominant. Most sequestration in ROW 
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occurs at the extensive margin – both through a reduction in the rate of deforestation and 
as well as and expansion of forest lands.  
 
Figure 20 aggregates across regions the sources of agriculture emissions reductions in 
response to a global carbon tax. In contrast to the US, the greatest scope for agriculture-
based emissions reductions globally is in ruminants, followed by rice. Whereas the wheat 
and coarse grains (“other grains”) sub-sector was the most important source of 
agriculture-based emissions reductions in the US, it is only half as important as paddy 
rice, and one-third as important as ruminant livestock production, in the world as a whole. 
 
Figure 21 reports the global abatement response to a global carbon tax. Not surprisingly, 
global abatement is dominated by ROW, which also comprises the bulk of the world’s 
land area and forests. The aggregate abatement schedules for land using activities in US 
and China are remarkably similar, with slight differences in neighborhood of $50/tonne 
carbon price.  
 
Competition for Land 
 
A key feature of these results is the within-region competition for land, by AEZ. In order 
to better understand this, we focus on one specific simulation, namely the $100/tonne 
carbon equivalent tax in the USA alone. The resulting change in land rents, by AEZ and 
sector, is reported at the top of Table 8. Note, first of all, that the change in land rents, in 
a given use, across AEZs, is nearly identical. This is due to our assumption of very high 
substitutability ( AEZσ = 20) between AEZs in a given use, which is in turn motivated by 
the fact that the final products produced on different AEZs face a common price. The 
latter fact dictates a common movement in land rents, provided the underlying 
technologies are similar, as assumed here.  
 
The second point to note from Table 8 is that the returns to land in paddy rice production 
fall sharply. The tax on methane emissions from rice production hits returns to land in 
this use very hard. Returns to land in other land-using sectors, including: other grains, 
other crops, forestry, and grazing uses, rise. The rise in forestry land rents is a direct 
consequence of the CO2 sequestration subsidy which lowers the cost of land to forestry, 
thereby boosting its use and hence the return to land owners. The size of the increase in 
forest land rents is driven by the relatively small share of land in total costs in this sector 
in the GTAP data base. More recent estimates suggest that this share is a substantial 
under-estimate. Making this adjustment will, in turn, greatly reduce the percentage 
increase in land rents following the sequestration subsidy. The rise in other grains, other 
crops, and ruminant land rents is a consequence of the combined effects of the increased 
demand for land by the forest sector and the carbon tax on non-land input use, e.g., 
fertilizer and ruminant capital. In the case of the latter effect, producers respond by 
substituting other inputs, including land, for the taxed input, the cost of which has risen 
substantially.  
 
These changes in land rents dictate changes in land use, by sector, which are reported in 
the next panel of Table 8. Here, we see that commercial forestry increases its use of land 
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substantially, while paddy rice dramatically reduces its use of land in response to the 
GHG emissions tax. Other crops and ruminants increase their use of the shorter length of 
growing period AEZ land types (2 and 3) and decrease their demand for longer length of 
growing period AEZ land (5 and 6) where forestry is more dominant. The latter action 
provides GHG emissions benefits, while the former offsets lost production. 
 
Of course, there can be a large percentage change in a variable with relatively little 
economic importance, and so the simple percentage change in land use is a bit misleading. 
The most natural way to scale the percentage change in land use is to pre-multiply it by 
the share of a given AEZ’s land rents generated by each activity in the base period data. 
The third panel in Table 8 does so, using the AEZ land rent shares reported at the bottom 
of Table 8 (fourth panel). Now we see that the expansion in other crop and ruminant land 
uses are relatively more important in the shorter length of growing period AEZ land 
classes relative to forestry. Therefore, in these AEZs, the basic story is one of cropland 
moving primarily into grazing activities. On the other hand, the direction of the land 
movement differs in the longer length of growing period AEZs (5 and 6). Here, grazing is 
relatively less important, while forestry becomes much more important (particularly in 
AEZ 6 where land rents from forestry reach about 10% of total land rents).  
 
A Global Perspective on Emissions Taxation: Competition in International Markets 
 
Taxes on emissions of greenhouse gases have important international ramifications. 
Recall from the abatement schedules presented above that, while the US reduces 
emissions in response to the US-only carbon tax, the ROW region takes full advantage of 
the opportunity presented to them, increasing emissions and so partially offsetting the US 
reductions. This emissions leakage is the result of the ROW region picking-up production 
in response to decreased US output. In this section, we try to elucidate these regional net 
emissions responses by providing a matrix of results showing the full set of interactions 
across regions and sectors. Table 9a offers such a view of the global interactions between 
emissions taxes (sequestration subsidies) in one region and emissions (sequestration) in 
another region. The table presents a decomposition of the effects of a global tax into the 
individual taxes/subsidies within each region, all based on results for the $100/tonne 
carbon-equivalent tax.  
 
For the simulation underpinning Table 9a, we utilize the numerical integration technique 
proposed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (2000, henceforth HHP) to apportion the 
impact of each group of instruments on total emissions in each region. This permits us to 
identify, for example, the contribution of the $100/tonne tax on paddy rice related 
emissions in USA on total emissions in ROW. The great virtue of the HHP 
decomposition technique is that all of the individual numbers add up in the end to the 
total impact. This would not be the case if we simply ran each group of policies 
separately and added up the resulting numbers. (The difference between the sum of the 
individual effects and the total effect is a measure of the interaction between policies.) 
 
The columns in Table 9a refer to emitting regions. So the percentage change in total 
emissions in USA amounts to a reduction of 76% in the wake of a $100/t C global tax 
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(Table 9a, Total Impact row, USA column). On the other hand, total emissions in ROW 
fall by about 140%. What explains this difference? For this we need to refer to the 
individual elements in each column. Together, they sum to the total emissions response 
given at the bottom of the table. The rows in this table show the breakdown (numerical 
decomposition) of the total mitigation impact – by type of instrument and region. So, for 
example, the impact of a $100/tonne tax on purchased input related emissions in USA on 
total USA emissions is -8.27%. On the other hand, the same tax in USA, leads to slightly 
higher aggregate emissions in ROW (+0.61%). As expected, the diagonal elements in 
each block of the table are negative, indicating that a tax on emissions in a particular 
region lowers overall emissions in that region.  
 
Identical carbon taxes in different regions can lead to very different responses in 
aggregate emissions. For example, while the $100/tonne purchased input-related 
emissions tax (i.e. fertilizer use in crops) in USA reduces total USA emissions by more 
than 8%, the same tax in ROW reduces total emissions in ROW by just 2.54% (ROW 
row, ROW column – purchased input related emissions). A $100/tonne Ceq tax on paddy 
rice and ruminant livestock production in China (i.e., primary factor taxes), results in a 
13% reduction in total emissions, while the comparable reduction in USA is just 2%. This 
is a direct consequence of the differential emissions intensities in these countries (recall 
Table 4 which showed these two sectors to be very emissions intensive in China). 
Similarly, the $100/tCeq forest sequestration subsidy results in a substantial increase in 
ROW forest carbon stocks – enough to reduce overall non-CO2 emissions and increase 
forest carbon in that region by more than 100% -- while the comparable reductions in 
USA and China are just 75% and 42% respectively.  
 
The off-diagonal elements of Table 9a tend to be positive, indicating that there is 
generally some “leakage” as other (untaxed) regions respond by increasing emissions of 
the activity on which the tax has been levied in one region – e.g., fertilizer use in crops, 
or paddy rice cultivation. Overall, the leakage effects are small, and the U.S. tends to 
have the largest leakage effects.  In particular, leakage in the U.S. is potentially 
significant with respect to forest sequestration in ROW. As forestry activity expands in 
ROW, agricultural output falls and US farm production expands to fill the void. The total 
impact at the $100/tonne sequestration subsidy is enough to boost USA land-based 
emissions by about 6%. In every case, the diagonal elements are dominant, indicating that 
the most important impact of a given carbon tax/sequestration subsidy is to reduce net 
emissions in the region where it is levied. 
 
It is also instructive to look at the abatement levels (vs. percentages). Table 9b shows 
how the composition of the abatement portfolio can vary from one region to the next. 
While forest sequestration is the dominant strategy in all regions, additional sequestration 
in ROW dwarfs that in other regions at around 2438 million t. Ceq. Paddy rice and 
livestock mitigation are a more important part of the mitigation portfolios in China and 
ROW in the face of a $100/tonne carbon price, while the fertilizer tax is relatively more 




4.  Conclusions 
 
We have developed a computable general equilibrium model with unique regional land 
types and detailed non-CO2 GHG emissions, with particular emphasis placed on land-
based greenhouse gas emissions and forest sequestration.  Using this framework, we are 
able to evaluate the relative importance of non-CO2 mitigation and forest carbon 
sequestration in different economic sectors and regions. We found that biophysical and 
economic characteristics can create comparative abatement advantages for GHG 
mitigation, both across sectors within a given country, and between the same sector in 
different countries. These comparative advantages result in intra- and inter-regional re-
allocations of production in response to carbon prices. We observe these general 
equilibrium effects in terms of emissions reductions/increased sequestration as well as 
production and land-use. We also find that international trade structure influences 
regional mitigation responses, as well as international GHG emissions leakage in land-
based activities in response to a regional carbon policy and profitable production 
increases despite increasing emissions subjected to a carbon tax.  
 
We base our assessment of partial equilibrium, mitigation possibilities in agriculture on 
detailed engineering and agronomic studies commissioned by the US Enviromental 
Protection Agency. In the case of forestry, we draw on estimates of optimal sequestration 
responses to global forest carbon subsidies, estimated with the model described in 
Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2006). In our global, general equilibrium analysis of carbon 
taxation, we find that forest carbon sequestration is the dominant means for global GHG 
emissions reduction in the land using sectors. However, when compared to the rest of the 
world, emissions abatement in the US comes disproportionately from agriculture, and, 
within agriculture, disproportionately from reductions in fertilizer-related emissions 
(primarily in maize production). In the world as a whole, agriculture-related mitigation 
comes predominantly in reduced methane emissions from ruminant livestock, which is 
followed in relative importance by reductions in methane emissions from paddy rice. We 
also find significant linkages between emissions in one region and mitigation in another 
(i.e. leakage). For example, in the US agriculture, abatement potential is cut in half when 
we move from a national tax to a global carbon tax. This is a consequence of the strong 
export orientation of US agriculture, which responds to reduced production in the rest of 
the world by increasing its own production and hence emissions. 
 
 
In the analysis, we we explore two avenues for carbon sequestration: intensive and 
extensive responses. We capture the former effect by fixing total land area in forestry and 
allowing the forestry sector to sacrifice commercial timber output in favor of increased 
carbon storage. We capture the latter effect by fixing the carbon intensity of forests and 
allowing total area to change. When the two are combined in our global general 
equilibrium simulations, the intensive margin accounts for about half the sequestration 
response in the US, but its relative importance in the rest of the world is smaller.  
 
In summary, we find the modified GTAP-AEZ model to be an extremely useful vehicle 
for integrating detailed emissions and abatement cost information into a global, general 
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equilibrium framework, thereby permitting investigation of intersectoral competition for 
land and other inputs, as well as international competition in product markets. There are 
two natural extensions of this work which would be immediately useful. Firstly, apart 
from time and effort, there is no reason why this could not be extended to more regions. 
Given that the emissions and land use data bases are available for countries, the 
constraining factors are just the GTAP data base itself, as well as the underlying 
mitigation cost studies. A second extension of this approach would bring into the model 
non-CO2 emissions from industrial and service sectors. These emissions data are also 
available from the EPA. In this context it would also make sense to include CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion. This would permit a complete, multi-gas 




Ahammad, H. (2006). “Modeling Land Use Change & Emissions in GTEM”, presented 
at the EMF-22 Land-use and Black Carbon Modeling Workshop, Washington, DC. 
February 1-3, 2006.  
 
Choi, S. (2004).  "The Potential and Cost of Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soil: 
An Empirical Study with a Dynamic Model fo the Midwestern U.S."  Ph.D. Thesis.  
Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics, Ohio State 
University.  
 
Dimaranan, B. V., Edt. (2006, forthcoming). Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: 
The GTAP 6 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, West 
Lafayette, IN47907, U.S.A. 
 
FAO and IIASA. (2000). Global Agro-Ecological Zones - 2000. Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, Rome, Italy, and International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. 
 
Harrison, J., Horridge, M. and Pearson, K.R., 2000. Decomposing simulation results with 
respect to exogenous shocks. Computational Economics, 15(3), 227–249. 
 
Houghton, R.A., 2003. “Revised estimates of the annual net flux of carbon to the 
atmosphere from changes in land use and land management: 1850-2000”, Tellus 
Series B-Chemical and Physical Meteorology, 55 (2), 378-390. 
 
Hyman, R.C., J.M. Reilly, M.H. Babiker, A. De Masin and H.D. Jacoby, 2003. Modeling 
Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Abatement. Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 8: 
175-186. 
 
Lee, H.-L., 2004. “Incorporating Agro-ecologically Zoned Data into the GTAP 
Framework”, paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference on Global Economic 
Analysis, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., June. 
 
Lee, H.-L., 2005. “An Emissions Data Base for Integrated Assessment of Climate 
Change Policy Using GTAP” GTAP GTAP Resource #1143, Center for Global Trade 
Analysis, Purdue University, 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=1143 
 
Lee, H.-L., T. W. Hertel, B. Sohngen and N. Ramankutty, 2005. Towards and Integrated 
Land Use Data Base for Assessing the Potential for Greenhouse Gas Mitigation. 




Li, C., W. Salas, B. DeAngelo, and S. Rose, 2006. “Assessing Alternatives for Mitigating 
Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Increasing Yields from Rice Production in China 
Over the Next 20 Years,” Journal of Environmental Quality 35(4). 
 
Murray, B.C., B.L. Sohngen, A.J. Sommer, B.M. Depro, K.M. Jones, B.A. McCarl, D. 
Gillig, B. DeAngelo, and K. Andrasko. 2005. EPA-R-05-006. "Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation Potential in U.S. Forestry and Agriculture." Washington, D.C: U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs. 
 
Olivier, J.G.J., 2002. Part III: Greenhouse gas emissions: 1. Shares and trends in 
greenhouse gas emissions; 2. Sources and Methods; Greenhouse gas emissions for 
1990 and 1995. In: "CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 1971-2000", 2002 Edition, 
pp. III.1-III.31. International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris. ISBN 92-64-09794-5.  
 
Richards, K., and C. Stokes, 2004. “A Review of Forest Carbon Sequestration Cost 
Studies: A Dozen Years of Research”, Climatic Change, 63 (1-2), 1-48. 
 
Rose, S., H. Ahammad, B. Eickhout, B. Fisher, A. Kurosawa, S. Rao, K. Riahi, and D. van 
Vuuren, 2006a. “Land in climate stabilization modeling,” Energy Modeling Forum 
Report, Stanford University, http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/home/index.htm 
 
Rose, S., S. Finn, E. Scheele, J. Mangino, and K. Delhotal, 2006b. “Detailed greenhouse 
gas emissions data for global economic modeling”, US Environmental Protection 
Agency, Washington, DC. 
 
Rose, S., Lee, H.-L., and others, 2006c. A Greenhouse Gases Data Base for Analysis of 
Climate Change Mitigation. Draft GTAP Technical Paper, Center for Global Trade 
Analysis, Purdue University. 
 
Sands, Ronald D. and Marian Leimbach, 2003. “Modeling Agriculture and Land Use in 
Integrated Assessment Framework,” Climatic Change 56: 185-210.  
 
Sohngen, B. and S. Brown.  2006.  "The Influence of Conversion of Forest Types on 
Carbon Sequestration and other Ecosystem Services in the South Central United 
States."  Ecological Economics.  57: 698-708. 
 
Sohngen, B. and R. Sedjo. 2000. "Potential Carbon Flux from Timber Harvests and 
Management in the Context of a Global Timber Market." Climatic Change.  44: 151-
172. 
 
Sohngen, B., R. Mendelsohn, and R. Sedjo. 2001.  "A Global Model of Climate Change 
Impacts on Timber Markets." Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.  
26(2): 326-343. 
 
Sohngen, B. and R. Mendelsohn.  2003.  “An Optimal Control Model of Forest Carbon 
Sequestration”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 85(2): 448-457. 
 28
Sohngen, B. and R. Mendelsohn.  2006.  "A Sensitivity Analysis of Carbon 
Sequestration."  In Human-Induced Climate Change: An Interdisciplinary Assessment.  
Edited by M. Schlesinger.  Cambridge University Press. 
Sohngen, B and R. Sedjo.  2006.  "Carbon Sequestration Costs in Global Forests."  
Forthcoming: Energy Journal 
 
Sohngen, B. and C. Tennity.  2005.  Country Specific Global Forest Data Set V.1.  
Mimeo.  Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics.  
Ohio State University.  http://aede.osu.edu/people/sohngen.1/forests/GTM/index.htm 
 
USEPA, 2006a. Global Emissions of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases: 1990-2020. Office of 
Air and Radiation, US Environmental Protection Agency (US-EPA), Washington, 
D.C. 
 
USEPA, 2006b. Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 430-R-06-005, 
http://www.epa.gov/nonco2/econ-inv/international.html 
  29
Table 1: Land rent at market price by AEZ and region (million 2001 US$) 
 USA China ROW Total 
AEZ1 1,590 405 5,373 7,368 
AEZ2 5,340 3,352 18,309 27,001 
AEZ3 3,011 6,076 44,896 53,983 
AEZ4 17,669 5,550 68,465 91,684 
AEZ5 7,219 9,365 43,199 59,783 
AEZ6 8,465 22,631 32,908 64,005 
 
 
Table 2: Non-CO2 emissions categories and associated economic drivers (activities) 

























Methane (CH4)            
Enteric fermentation       x x             
Manure management       x x             
Rice cultivation x                     
Biomass burning x x x x               
Other industrial non-agriculture                     x 
Stationary and mobile combustion x x x x x x x x x x x 
Nitrous oxide (N2O)            
Agricultural soils x x x                 
Manure management       x x             
Pasture, range, and paddock       x x             
Biomass burning x x x x               
Other industrial non-agriculture                     x 





Table 3: Non-CO2 GHG emissions by sector and emissions driver category 
     Sectors:    
   Paddy Rice Other Grain Other Crops Ruminants Non-Ruminants Forest 
Region total 
USA 2.971 37.707 23.707 48.778 7.904 0.002 566.332 
China 70.160 20.284 77.911 68.773 41.884 0.017 576.044 
ROW 137.364 101.363 167.219 630.131 79.590 0.079 2916.635 
Total non-CO2 emissions 
(MtCeq) 
World 210.495 159.354 268.837 747.682 129.378 0.097 4059.011 
USA 0 0 1 0 0 0 75 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 
ROW 0 2 2 0 0 0 60 Output 
World 0 1 2 0 0 0 61 
USA 69 0 0 100 100 0 10 
China 85 0 0 100 100 0 30 
ROW 79 0 0 100 100 0 28 Endowment 
World 80 0 0 100 100 0 26 
USA 31 100 99 0 0 100 14 
China 15 100 100 0 0 100 20 













Table 4: Key emissions intensities (MtC/$ of input, where MtC = 1000 Kg C) 
Emission intensities (MtC/$ of input)  
Forest carbon intensities  
(MtC/$ of land rent) 
Input USA China ROW USA China ROW 
Fertilizer in crops production 0.0062 0.0044 0.0044 0.057  0.016  0.148  
Ruminant livestock capital 0.0099 0.9562 0.0154    




Table 5: Elasticities of substitution calibrated for emissions mitigation and 
sequestration 
    Sectors:    
















USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Output 
elasticities 
ROW 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 0.5 1.3 0.5 0 0 0 
China 0.5 0.6 0.5 0 0 0 
Intermediate 
input 
elasticities ROW 0.5 1.5 0.5 0 0 0 
Endowment 
elasticities 
World 1.1 0.237198 0.237198 0.191 2 0.2 







Table 6: Carbon sequestration supply schedule: by category, annual equivalent 
abatement over 20 years (MMTCE)** 
Carbon price Extensive 
Margin Intensive Margin Wood Products
Access 
Margin** Total 
US   
5 1.672 -1.663 -0.476 0.839 0.371 
10 3.509 6.802 -0.238 1.346 11.419 
20 7.023 24.585 -0.084 2.866 34.390 
50 17.811 73.503 -0.948 5.147 95.513 
100 43.069 102.749 -0.132 9.298 154.986 
200 118.287 119.006 1.667 19.931 258.893 
500 270.741 286.616 0.537 25.322 583.216 
CHINA   
5 0.440 3.018 -0.028 4.733 8.164 
10 0.612 14.865 -0.282 9.966 25.161 
20 1.210 26.899 -0.372 21.765 49.501
50 4.154 73.928 -1.532 53.501 130.051 
100 12.797 98.522 -2.018 77.089 186.390 
200 73.532 97.503 -1.325 77.089 246.799 
500 108.663 202.142 -5.082 77.089 382.812 
ROW   
5 143.218 31.572 -3.614 -19.259 151.917 
10 281.670 78.626 -5.956 -2.370 351.969 
20 539.266 114.936 -9.437 14.203 658.968 
50 1203.164 250.691 -19.898 66.875 1500.832 
100 1672.509 387.619 -29.708 80.424 2110.845 
200 2189.741 366.732 -21.178 93.365 2628.660 
500 2885.440 868.723 -47.496 103.227 3809.894 
Source: Results based on model described in Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2006). 
* Calculated assuming a 5% discount rate. 
** Storage due to setting aside of forests at accessible margin in temperate and boreal 
regions only  
 
Table 7: Change in regional trade balances due to unilateral carbon taxes: $100/t. 
 USA only ROW only China only 
Sector USA CHN ROW USA CHN ROW USA CHN ROW
Rice -203 19 180 798 540 -1331 34 -241 192
OtherGrain -2765 118 2700 5593 885 -6488 263 -600 323
OtherCrops -2770 185 2510 4244 2857 -6991 97 -929 828
Ruminants -1756 8 1689 5333 175 -5390 21 -181 157
NonRuminants -240 38 208 1122 558 -1633 122 -548 426
OthFood -102 4 115 1539 206 -1343 100 -627 539
Forest Prdts 1486 -105 -1340 -3142 -1103 4592 -154 726 -590
Fertilizer & 
Engy Int Mnfcs 1729 0 -1648 -3553 284 4474 -319 2126 -1727
OtherMnfcSves 4907 -218 -4747 -16237 -5610 19630 133 -760 589
Total 285 49 -334 -4303 -1207 5519 297 -1034 738
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Table 8: Percentage change in U.S.A. land rents and land use by sector following a 
$100/tonne Carbon tax in USA only  
Percentage change in land rents  
 Forest Paddy Rice Other Grain Other Crops Ruminants  
AEZ1 1225.70  -21.39  10.13  14.08  17.59   
AEZ2 1224.09  -19.40  9.93  13.88  17.38   
AEZ3 1223.97  -19.18  9.91  13.86  17.36   
AEZ4 1225.44  -20.85  10.07  14.02  17.53   
AEZ5 1228.88  -25.59  10.41  14.36  17.91   
AEZ6 1235.81  -38.88  11.19  15.16  18.71   
Percentage change in land use  
 Forest Paddy Rice Other Grain Other Crops Ruminants  
AEZ1 78.66  -29.03  -4.77  -1.84  -1.48   
AEZ2 83.04  -25.16  -1.89  1.10  1.44   
AEZ3 83.33  -24.79  -1.62  1.37  1.77   
AEZ4 79.31  -27.99  -3.95  -1.00  -0.60   
AEZ5 70.20  -35.04  -8.56  -5.70  -5.80   
AEZ6 52.94  -51.45  -19.02  -16.33  -16.21   
Percentage change in land use, weighted by AEZ land rent share  
 Forest Paddy Rice Other Grain Other Crops Ruminants  
AEZ1 2.23  -0.06  -0.98  -0.32  -0.84   
AEZ2 0.10  -0.04  -0.79  0.31  0.42   
AEZ3 0.11  -0.09  -0.77  0.54  0.21   
AEZ4 2.38  -0.05  -1.85  -0.39  -0.05   
AEZ5 6.96  -0.73  -3.95  -1.57  -0.42   
AEZ6 12.61  -1.05  -3.05  -7.22  -0.37   
AEZ land rent shares  
 Forest Paddy Rice Other Grain Other Crops Ruminants Total
AEZ1 0.008 0.002 0.218 0.184 0.588 1 
AEZ2 0.000 0.002 0.426 0.283 0.289 1 
AEZ3 0.000 0.004 0.481 0.397 0.118 1 
AEZ4 0.008 0.002 0.493 0.408 0.089 1 
AEZ5 0.031 0.026 0.539 0.321 0.083 1 
AEZ6 0.095 0.031 0.221 0.622 0.030 1 
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Table 9a: General equilibrium impact of emissions taxes on net emissions in each 
region following a global tax of $100/tCeq (percentage change) 
  Emissions/sequestration change from region (%) 
Type/region of taxation USA CHN ROW 
USA -0.01 0 0 
CHN 0 0 0 Output related emissions 
ROW 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
USA -8.27 0.08 0.61 
CHN 0.28 -4.26 0.32 Purchased input related emissions 
ROW 1.73 0.27 -2.54 
USA -1.98 0.01 0.19 
CHN -0.04 -12.88 -0.04 Primary factor related emissions 
ROW 0.79 0.15 -7.41 
USA -75.37 0.04 0.6 




 ROW 6.27 0.9 -131.58 
Total Impact  -76.48 -58.63 -139.69 
 
Table 9b: General equilibrium impact of emissions taxes on net emissions in each 
region following a global tax of $100/tCeq (levels change) 
 
  Emissions change from region (MtCeq) 
Type/region of taxation USA CHN ROW 
USA -0.03  0.00  0.00  
CHN 0.00  0.00  0.00  Output related emissions 
ROW 0.09  0.04  -0.37  
USA -24.07  0.31  11.30  
CHN 0.81  -16.75  5.93  Purchased input related emissions 
ROW 5.04  1.06  -47.06  
USA -5.76  0.04  3.52  
CHN -0.12  -50.64  -0.74  Primary factor related emissions 
ROW 2.30  0.59  -137.30  
USA -219.38  0.16  11.12  
CHN 0.26  -168.90  3.34  Forest sequestration 
ROW 18.25  3.54  -2438.11  




Figure 1: GTAP’s 18 Agro-Ecological Zones 
 
 
Source: Lee et al. (2005) 
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Figure 3: Total non-CO2 GHG emissions by region and sector (MtCeq) 
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Figure 8: Calibration of USA cropland GHG mitigation costs 




















Figure 9: Calibrated ROW forest carbon sequestration curve via extensification (20-year annual equivalent abatement) 































Figure 10: Calibrated USA forest carbon sequestration curve via intensification (20-year annual equivalent abatement) 






























Figure 11: USA agriculture and forestry general equilibrium GHG abatement supply schedules for USA-only carbon tax 
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Figure 12: USA agriculture subsector GHG abatement supply schedules for USA-only carbon tax 



































Figure 13: ROW agriculture subsector GHG abatement supply schedules for USA-only carbon tax 



































Figure 14: ROW agriculture and forestry general equilibrium GHG abatement supply schedules for USA-only carbon tax  
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Figure 15: USA agriculture and forestry general equilibrium GHG abatement supply schedules for ROW-only carbon tax  
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Figure 16: USA agriculture subsector GHG abatement supply schedules for ROW-only carbon tax 



































Figure 17: USA agriculture subsector GHG abatement supply schedules for global carbon tax 



































Figure 18: USA agriculture and forestry general equilibrium GHG abatement supply schedules for global carbon tax  


































Figure 19: ROW sectoral general equilibrium GHG abatement supply schedules for global carbon tax 

































Figures 20: Global agriculture subsector GHG abatement supply schedules for global carbon tax 




































Figure 21: Regional general equilibrium GHG abatement supply schedules for global carbon tax (HL: all prod_comm taxes) 
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